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This paper provides a quantitative study of the economic effects of a stylised simulation of 
trade liberalisation for Ireland using the GTAP model. The experiment incorporates the 
liberalisation of agricultural, manufacturing and services trade as well as measures to 
improve trade facilitation. The simulation is implemented against a baseline projection of 
the Irish and world economy over the next decade. Overall, Ireland’s welfare will increase 
as a result of further trade liberalisation, with particularly strong gains from services 
liberalisation. The industrial liberalisation scenario also generates positive gains to Ireland, 
while agricultural liberalisation has a slightly negative effect on the overall economy. 
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 1  Introduction 
The Doha Round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade negotiations was launched in 
Qatar in November 2001. A successful outcome to this Round would have long-term 
effects on all countries involved. This paper examines the consequences of further trade 
liberalisation on the Irish economy, although the nature of the model used means that 
Ireland is not seen in isolation, rather as an interdependent part of the world economy.  
 
A computable general equilibrium model is used to quantify the potential outcomes of 
Doha. The model used in this study, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and 
database, is well suited for modelling the impact of changes in the world trading system. 
The base year of the latest version of the GTAP database is 2001. Even if WTO 
negotiations reach a successful conclusion in the near future, the time-span for 
implementation and the impact of reforms will stretch over a number of years. With this in 
mind, the base data are projected forward to 2014 to allow more realistic modelling of the 
effects of any agreement. The simulation of the trade liberalisation scenarios is then 
implemented by introducing shocks to this baseline.  
 
Given the preferential access which Ireland enjoys to other EU country markets as a 
member of the EU, the effects of further liberalisation of world trade are ambiguous. 
Liberalisation leads to an erosion of these preferential benefits which are particularly 
important in the case of agricultural trade. Hence the value of an empirical study to attempt 
to quantify the overall impact of a successful Doha Round on Ireland. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the GTAP model and 
database and the process of projecting the world economy forward to 2014 and the 
structural changes that result. Sections 3 and 4 outline the trade liberalisation scenario   3
simulated in this paper and the results of the simulation. Section 5 presents the 
conclusions.   
 
2 Methodology 
2.1 The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model and Database 
The empirical work undertaken in this paper employs the computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model and database known as GTAP. This type of model is a powerful tool 
enabling quantitative analysis of trade issues. GTAP in particular, with its wide country 
coverage and extensive database, is designed for precisely this task. 
 
The standard GTAP model is a one period, multi-regional, CGE model. All markets in the 
model are perfectly competitive and exhibit constant returns to scale. The primary 
reference for information on the model is Hertel (1997) and the GTAP website.
1 
 
The world economy consists of eighty-seven economies (referred to in the model as 
“regions”) and fifty-seven sectors/commodities interlinked via demand and production 
linkages within regions, and bilateral trade flows between them. The structure of these 
regions is the same. Each provides an elaborate representation of the economy including 
the interactions between the agents in the model (private households, government and 
firms) and linkages between all of world production and trade. The number of sectors is 
the same in each region and all commodities are produced in every region. The Armington 
(1969) assumption is used to differentiate between homogenous commodities from 
different regions. 
 
                                                 
1 GTAP website: www.gtap.org.   4
The construction and calibration of the database is documented in Dimaranan and 
McDougall (2005). The database is composed of three broad parts - national input-output 
tables for each region represented in the model, international trade data linking the regions 
and protection data. The base year of the current version is 2001 and all data is represented 
in 2001 US dollars. 
 
2.2 Model Closure and Aggregation 
A standard general equilibrium closure is used in all simulations in this paper. This implies 
all prices (except the numeraire)
2, regional incomes and quantities of producible 
commodities are determined endogenously. Tax (or subsidy) rates, technology and factor 
endowments are exogenously fixed. A medium-term closure is assumed. Labour and capital 
are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors. Land and natural resources are 
imperfectly mobile (or sluggish) between sectors. No factor endowments are mobile 
between regions and all are assumed to be fully employed within regions (there is no 
unemployment of labour or capital). In terms of macroeconomic closure, investment is 
savings driven and the current balance is assumed to be exogenous. 
 
In this paper, Ireland is distinguished as a separate region, allowing for the breakdown of 
scenario outcomes at both national and global levels. The three largest EU economies as 
well as the US, Canada, China and India are also individually represented. Nine agrifood 
sectors have been distinguished, consisting both of primary agriculture and processed 
products. There are also nine manufacturing industries (including electronics, textiles and 
chemical products sectors separately distinguished) and five service sectors. Table 1 shows 
the full regional and sectoral aggregation chosen in this paper. 
                                                 
2 Because all prices are endogenous in a CGE model, one price (or price index) must be chosen as a 
numeraire in which to express relative price changes. In this closure, the numeraire is a composite world price 
index of primary factors.    5
 
INSERT TABLE 1 about here 
 
2.3 Construction of the Baseline 2001 - 2014  
The base year of the current version 6.0 of the GTAP database is 2001. Since then, a 
number of important trade policy developments have taken place. Also, even if WTO 
negotiations reach a successful conclusion in the near future, the time-span for 
implementation and impact of reforms will stretch over a number of years. With this in 
mind, the base data is projected forward until 2014 to allow more realistic modelling of the 
effects of any agreement.  
 
The construction of this baseline is achieved by running a pre-simulation experiment, the 
outcome of which is used as a baseline against which to compare the results of the trade 
liberalisations scenarios implemented in the study. The construction of the baseline is 
divided into two components. Firstly, policy changes, both events that have already 
occurred since 2001 and those that are expected to occur in the future, are implemented to 
create a more realistic policy landscape. Secondly, macroeconomic projections are used to 
simulate the expected changes to the world economy between the dates in question. 
 
The structural changes to the world economy included in this baseline are: the accession of 
the People’s Republic of China to the WTO; the Agenda 2000 and Mid-term Review 
reforms of the CAP; the accession of twelve central and eastern European Countries to the 
EU; the full implementation of the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) Agreement between the 
EU and fifty of the world’s least developed countries; and the elimination of Multi-Fibre 
Agreement textile quotas as foreseen under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothes. We   6
also assume that Russia joins the WTO during the baseline period. The terms of accession 
are not specifically modelled, but Russia is assumed to participate in the liberalisation 
scenarios based on its tariff structure in 2001.
3 
 
The second phase in constructing the baseline to 2014 is to shock factor endowments in 
the model following the approach of Walmsley et al. (2000). These shocks are based on 
forecasts of factor growth rates over the baseline period. GDP, skilled and unskilled labour, 
population and capital stock in each region are shocked. The main source is Brockmeier 
and Salamon (2003) with additional data from Jensen and Frandsen (2003). For Ireland, 




The initial pre-simulation experiment suggested an unrealistically high growth of 
agricultural production in the EU, evaluated on the basis of expert opinion. In the baseline 
represented here, the growth of primary agricultural sectors has been constrained to target 
the growth rates expected (in the absence of policy change) in the most recent European 
Commission (2004) forecast of the likely market balance for agricultural products up to 
2014. The same growth rates were applied to each of the separate EU countries and 
regions distinguished in the model database. 
 
2.4 The EU Agricultural Budget Module 
In the standard GTAP model there is no direct link between tax revenue and government 
expenditure and there is no explicit representation of the EU budget. Agricultural subsidies 
(direct payments, input and output subsidies, market price support and export subsidies) in 
                                                 
3 The way these policy changes are modelled is explained in greater detail in Matthews and Walsh (2005). 
4 See Matthews and Walsh (2005) for the details of these factor endowment shocks.   7
Ireland are assumed entirely financed through the Irish regional household, and there are 
no intra-European revenue or expenditure flows. This underestimates the negative impact 
of reforms which lower market prices and thus the inflow of CAP funds for a net 
exporting country in the EU. 
 
To accurately model shocks such as enlargement or, at a later stage, to simulate the effects 
of trade liberalisation within a regional union such as the EU, the standard GTAP model is 
extended to incorporate an EU agricultural budget module based on the approach of 
Brockmeier (2003). This is accomplished via the addition of a new social accounting matrix 
that moves the EAGGF revenues and expenditures from the regional household to the EU 
budget. The EU collects 75% of import tariff revenues
 from agents in the model and a 
GDP
5 tax is levied on the regional households of the member regions. This tax is 
determined endogenously to ensure the overall EU agricultural budget is balanced and it 
thus approximates both the VAT and GDP elements of revenue that accrue to the EU. 
The difference between revenues and expenditures of each member state is the net transfer 
to that region arising from the operation of the CAP. The sum of the net transfers of each 
region is zero to ensure that the overall agricultural budget balances. To avoid 
misunderstanding, it should be stressed that what is being modelled here is the EU 
agricultural budget, and not the full EU budget. Structural fund contributions, for example, 
are excluded. This should be borne in mind when interpreting the budget figures later in 
this paper. 
 
                                                 
5 In reality, the EU taxes gross national income (GNI), however in GTAP any such taxes are levied on the 
regional household.   8
2.5 The Irish Economy in 2014 
This section describes the structure of the Irish economy in 2014 following the updating of 
the baseline as described in the previous section. The impact of WTO liberalisation will be 
determined by both the production and consumption structure of the economy and by the 
structure of protection assumed in the baseline in that year, rather than the economic and 
protection structures in 2001. It is a stylised representation of the Irish economy, and is not 
intended to capture detailed projections of individual sectors.  
 
The growth rate assumed for Ireland over the baseline period is greater than for the other 
EU countries. Between 2001 and 2014, GDP increases by eighty per cent, capital more 
than doubles, and the population and labour force increase by between seven and ten per 
cent.  
 
Table 2 shows the structure of the Irish economy, including trade flows, output and 
domestic consumption, before and after the changes described in the section above are 
implemented, providing a baseline against which to compare the results of the simulations 
to follow. The importance of intra-EU trade to Ireland is a key factor underlying many of 
these results, hence the value for Ireland of intra-EU and extra-EU trade are indicated.
6 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 about here 
 
All non-agricultural sectors expand in line with the projected overall growth of the 
economy over the period. The growth in the primary agricultural sectors, apart from sugar 
and raw milk, is constrained to meet the Commission’s forecasts for output growth in the 
                                                 
6 The 2001 figures in Table 2 reflect those in the GTAP database. These data underestimate the degree of 
self-sufficiency for some agrifood sectors, for example, beef and sheepmeat and dairy products, and this 
caveat should be noted in interpreting the results.    9
EU as a whole. Output of sugar and raw milk is assumed constrained by quota. Domestic 
consumption of all commodities, except for other livestock, increases, in particular 
chemical and petroleum products and other private services.  
 
At a more aggregated level the growth of output in agriculture trails far behind that in 
industry and services. As incomes increase and a region becomes richer, consumption 
tends to shift from primary commodities to industrial goods and services. In the case of 
Ireland in 2014, the increase in industrial output compared with 2001 is particularly strong, 
reflecting the open, export-orientated nature of the economy. The increase in industrial 
output is driven by an increase in demand for Irish exports.  
 
The levels of trade protection applied to Irish imports and exports in 2001 and 2014 by 
industry are shown in Table 3. The data are calculated as the ratio of tariff revenue 
collected to the value of trade at world prices, and thus represent trade-weighted average 
applied tariffs by sector.
7 The calculated applied tariffs on ‘All Trade’ are lower than those 
shown for ‘Extra-EU Trade’ as they take into account the zero tariffs that apply on intra-
EU trade. The dramatically higher levels of protection for some of the agrifood sectors 
stand out. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 about here 
 
Applied trade protection for Irish exports and imports by source and destination are shown 
in Figure 1. The only notable changes are the elimination of barriers to trade between 
                                                 
7 These tariff values may be sensitive to very small volumes of trade in some sectors. Also, the method of 
calculating average tariffs may underestimate the degree of protection provided to Irish agriculture, to the 
extent that the volume of imports at world prices may represent preferential import prices rather than the 
‘true’ world price. This is likely to be important in the case of sugar, for example, where EU import values 
reflect the price paid to ACP exporters that is linked to the EU producer price rather than the world price.   10
Ireland and the new EU members and of import tariffs levied on commodities exported 




INSERT FIGURE 1 about here 
 
3  Trade Liberalisation: Negotiations and Simulations 
3.1 What’s Under Negotiation in the Doha Round? 
The Doha negotiations are comprehensive both in terms of their country coverage and 
sectoral coverage. They cover liberalisation of agricultural, manufacturing and services 
trade as well as clarification of WTO rules. This section outlines some the main issues in 
these areas. The actual trade liberalisation simulation implemented in then described in 
Section 3.2. 
 
Following the near collapse of the Doha Round at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Council in 
Cancún in September 2003, a Framework was agreed in July 2004 that provides a structure 
for negotiations towards a final agreement. However, as it contains few specific figures or 
targets, a stylised simulation of further liberalisation is constructed. This does not seek to 
approximate any particular negotiation modalities likely to emerge from WTO talks. Rather 
it examines the effects of broad liberalisation measures. 
  
3.1.1 Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
The modalities on agricultural products agreed in July 2004 do not include specific targets 
for the cuts in two of the pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture: market access and   11
domestic support. On market access, import tariffs are to be reduced on a tiered basis such 
that those members with higher tariff levels will implement the largest cuts. The number of 
tiers, the depth of the reduction, the placement of commodities and regions in tiers and the 
treatment of sensitive products have not yet been agreed. 
 
On domestic support, the only firm commitment contained in the Framework is the 
agreement that overall trade distorting support will not exceed 80 per cent of its current 
level by the end of the first year. This includes final bound AMS (aggregate measure of 
support), the permitted de minimis levels and permitted blue box levels, with future 
reductions to be based on a tiered formula implying greater reductions for those countries 
that maintain the highest levels of support. 
 
For the third pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture, export competition, the July 
Framework contains a commitment to fully phase out the use of export subsidies for 
agricultural products. 
 
3.1.2 Manufacturing Trade Liberalisation 
The July Framework text on non-agricultural market access (NAMA) contains few details. 
WTO members have agreed that improvements in non-agricultural market access in the 
Doha Round are to be based on a formula approach, with the precise details, and other 
issues such as the treatment of tariff escalation and tariff peaks, still the subject of 
negotiation.  
 
A consensus is emerging that an agreement on NAMA will not be reached until 
negotiations on agriculture are nearer to conclusion with members waiting to judge the   12
perceived ambition of any such agreement (ICTSD, 2005). The US and many industrialised 
countries are pressing for a sector-based approach. However, they face opposition from 
developing country groups who favour a broad tariff reduction formula with the possibility 
of specific sectoral arrangements only once the overall reduction formula has been agreed 
upon. 
 
3.1.3 Services Trade Liberalisation 
Given the large share of trade in services that is accounted for by FDI in services and, in 
particular, its importance to the Irish economy, the outcome of any agreement on services 
will have significant consequences for Ireland.  
 
GTAP is lacking on two fronts in terms of trade in services. The standard model structure 
does not allow for foreign direct investment and the database includes no import barriers 
(tariff equivalents to the qualitative barriers) for service sectors. To model service 
liberalisation requires quantitative estimates of trade barriers. However, unlike the case of 
agriculture and manufacturing, in services these barriers tend be qualitative rather than 
quantitative in nature. Such barriers include the existence of national monopolies in service 
sectors, restriction of certain activities to domestic firms or regulation on the establishment 
and operation of foreign service providers. The difficulties in measuring non-tariff barriers 
and modelling trade in services are well documented (e.g., Francois et al. 2005 or Dee and 
Hanslow, 2000). 
 
3.1.4 Trade Facilitation 
Trade facilitation is now the only one of the four so-called Singapore issues still under 
negotiation in the Doha Round. Bagai et al. (2004, p2) define trade facilitation as   13
encompassing “the domestic policies, institutions and infrastructure associated with the 
movement of goods across borders”. In the WTO, the definition of trade facilitation is less 
broad. The Doha Declaration text cites fees and formalities, transit and transparency. 
 
It has been estimated (Wilson, 2003) that, with increased liberalisation of world trade and 
reductions in import tariffs, the cost of moving goods across borders is as important as the 
cost of tariffs. An OECD (2002) survey finds that trade transactions costs vary between 2 
per cent and 15 per cent of total trade costs. Its importance and sensitivity were clearly 
illustrated in Cancún with the break-down of negotiations due to the refusal of developing 
countries to accept EU proposals over the Singapore issues.  
 
An agreement on trade facilitation will have to balance the desire for reductions in 
transactions costs, with the political will and physical capacity of developing countries to 
achieve trade facilitation programmes. Walkenhorst and Yasui (2003) suggest that 
developing countries have the most scope to gain from trade facilitation as they have less 
efficient border procedures and because of the nature of their trade patterns (importance 
of primary goods and the pre-dominance of small and medium-sized firms). 
 
Improved trade facilitation is assumed not to apply to services, to prevent an overlap with 
the previous simulation. In the context of the WTO, trade facilitation refers to the 
reduction in administrative barriers to the importation of goods as opposed to barriers to 
trade in services as discussed in the section above which fall under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
   14
3.2 Simulation Design 
The trade liberalisation simulation is implemented using the updated database created from 
the baseline experiments described in the previous section. The shocks required to 
implement the scenario are thus implemented against this baseline featuring the Irish and 
global economy as projected in 2014.  
 
For import tariffs, a linear cut across all agricultural and manufacturing sectors is imposed.
8 
Industrialised countries implement reductions of 50 per cent. To reflect the special and 
differential treatment of developing countries, the import tariffs of these regions are 
subjected to a 34 per cent reduction (two-thirds of the levels of industrialised countries), 
and least developed countries are exempted from any reduction commitment.
 9  
 
As noted in Section 3.1.1, the July Framework contains a commitment to fully phase out 
the use of export subsidies for agricultural products and therefore their complete 
elimination has been implemented in the simulation.  
 
Domestic support as currently represented in the standard GTAP model does not allow for 
a full analysis of overall distorting support as defined in the July Framework. Therefore, 
reductions in domestic support are simulated as cuts to direct payments linked to 
production, intermediate input subsidies and output subsidies. Payments decoupled from 
                                                 
8 The tariff rates in the GTAP model and database are effective (or applied) rates. WTO negotiations are 
based on bound tariff levels. In many cases, there will be a degree of tariff overhang whereby the bound 
ceiling exceeds the applied rate by a considerable amount. A 50 per cent in the bound rate may not translate 
into an equal reduction in applied rates. Implementing reductions in applied rates by 50 per cent may 
overestimate the gains from trade liberalisation unless the average cut in bound rates agreed in the Doha 
Round negotiations is substantially greater. In other words, cutting effective tariffs by 50 per cent implies 
agreement on a substantially larger cut in bound tariffs once the tariff overhang impact is factored in. 
9 Industrialised countries / regions in this paper are: EU27, USA, Canada, High Income Asian countries, Rest 
of EFTA and the Former Soviet Union. Developing countries / regions are: Mediterranean, China, India, 
Rest of Asia, Rest of the ACP countries, Mercosur, Rest of Latin America and Rest of the World. Least 
developed countries are approximated by the EBA group of countries.   15
production in the EU and US are assumed to qualify for the Green Box and therefore are 
exempt from reductions. The market price support components of AMS are not modelled. 
The reduction implemented is a modest cut of 20 per cent for non-exempt support in the 
EU and US and 5 per cent for all other regions reflecting the tiered formula approach 




For services trade, estimates based on research by Francois et al. (2005) to calculate the 
tariff equivalents to barriers to trade in services are employed. These are tariff equivalents 
for services imported in a country or region. In the case of the EU regions, they apply to 
both intra-EU and extra-EU trade. The tariff equivalent of services trade barriers is 
estimated to vary between 2.0 and 2.6 percent in the EU, between 0 and 5.2 per cent in 
other industrialised countries, and between 6.0 and 7.0 per cent in developing countries. 
 
In the simulation these tariff equivalents are cut by 50 per cent. This is modelled as a 
positive productivity shock to imports of service commodities entering a region, 
implemented by exogenously shocking the appropriate technology variable in each of the 
five service sectors in this aggregation. For EU regions, it is applied only to imports from 
third countries. Whilst barriers to trade in services within the single market remain, they are 
not subject to WTO negotiations but rather they fall within the competence of the 
European Community. Service trade imports from the USA to Ireland are also exempted 
from this shock. The Irish economic landscape is dominated by multinational firms, 
primarily from the US, who in the main produce goods. The Irish services trade balance is 
distorted as a result of this with very large license and royalty payments that are not really 
                                                 
10 The same caveat, regarding differences in bound and applied tariff rates and the degree of overhang as 
discussed above, applies to domestic support also. Applied domestic support is cut by 20 per cent, the bound 
level of support and the degree of overhang is not considered.   16
imports per se. As these are effectively paper transactions, it is assumed that they do not face 
any trade barriers. While most countries will have this effect to a degree, the unusual 
feature of Ireland’s economy justifies taking explicit account of this fact.   
 
The simulation of an agreement on trade facilitation also follows the approach of Francois 
et al. (2005). Improved trade facilitation is modelled as a positive technology shock to 
imports entering into a county or region. Based on a survey of a range of estimates of the 
benefits of trade facilitation, Francois et al. simulate a conservative saving of 1.5 per cent in 
the cost of importing agricultural and manufacturing commodities. In this paper, the shock 
is tiered to reflect that developing countries have the greatest potential to gain from trade 
facilitation. Improved trade facilitation is assumed to imply a cut of 1.5 per cent of import 
costs for least developed countries, 1 per cent for developing countries and 0.5 per cent for 
industrialised countries. In the case of the EU countries, this shock is only applied to extra-
EU imports on the assumption that membership of the single market has already 
eliminated customs formalities between members and hence reduces the scope of possible 
gains from trade facilitation. 
Box 1: Summary of the Trade Liberalisation Scenario 
 
Import Tariffs: applied agricultural and manufacturing import tariffs are reduced by 50, 34 and 0 
per cent for industrialised, developing and least developed countries respectively.  
 
Export Subsidies: a global elimination of agricultural export subsidies. 
 
Domestic Support: trade-distorting domestic support is reduced by 20 per cent in the EU and USA 
and by 5 per cent elsewhere. 
 
Services: a 50 per cent reduction in the tariff equivalents of barriers to trade in services. Again, 
special and differential treatment applies to developing regions. This is not applied to intra-EU trade 
in services or exports from the USA to Ireland. 
 
Trade Facilitation: modelled as a reduction in the cost of importing all agricultural and 
manufacturing commodities (1.5 per cent cost reduction for least developed, 1 per cent for 
developing and 0.5 for industrialised countries). In the case of the EU, this applies only to imports 
from non-member countries. 
   17
 
4 Results 
4.1 Welfare Effects 
The global changes in welfare of the trade liberalisation experiments are presented in Table 
4. The contribution of liberalisation by industrialised countries (ICs) alone to the global 
total is also shown. The net result is a gain for the world economy as whole of 0.30 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP).  Ireland’s welfare will also increase as a result of 
further trade liberalisation as simulated here. The total welfare effect amounts to 0.08 per 
cent of GDP.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 about here 
 
The decomposition of the welfare results for Ireland is shown in Table 5. Allocative 
efficiency effects and technological improvements drive the positive welfare result. The 
latter are due to the exogenous shocks introduced to the model in order to simulate trade 
liberalisation in services and trade facilitation. The investment and savings price effect is a 
terms of trade effect for the capital account. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 about here 
 
Allocative efficiency gains arise when distortions such as domestic support and import 
tariffs are reduced or eliminated, as this allows the market to move closer to its competitive 
equilibrium and reduces the efficiency losses associated with any tax or subsidy. The 
allocative effects stem mainly from agriculture, reflecting the high levels of protection for 
agricultural sectors in the 2014 baseline.   18
 
The terms of trade effect is negative for Ireland. The reduction of export subsidies in 
agriculture and increased trade facilitation both contribute to a fall in export prices relative 
to import prices. For a small, export oriented economy like Ireland this results in a loss as 
Irish producers receive a lower price for their goods on the world market relative to the 
cost of what they buy. In addition, given the high degree of Irish trade destined for EU 
markets, the erosion of preferential access to EU markets leads to some welfare losses for 
Irish producers. 
 
Table 5 also shows the welfare effects for Ireland decomposed by liberalisation in 
agriculture, manufacturing, services and trade facilitation. The results indicate that 
reductions in barriers to services trade will generate particularly strong gains from services 
liberalisation. The industrial liberalisation scenario also generates positive gains to Ireland, 
while agricultural liberalisation and trade facilitation have slightly negative welfare effects. 
 
The decomposition for agricultural trade liberalisation needs to be interpreted in the light 
of the way the model is set up. Overall, Ireland experiences a slight negative loss in terms 
of GDP. The largest effect is the effect on Ireland’s contribution to the EU budget. This 
result arises because the gain from improved allocative efficiency is offset by the reduction 
in net transfers from the EU agricultural budget. 
 
As noted above, in the GTAP model CAP support instruments are assumed to be financed 
domestically, rather than by the EU, hence all allocative efficiency gains are captured by the 
region in question. The integration of the EU agricultural budget module described in 
Section 2.4 allows the calculation of the effect of changes in budgetary flows resulting from 
the liberalisation scenario. Prior to the simulation in 2014 Ireland is a net recipient of EU   19
funds. The effect of liberalising agricultural trade alone (not considering liberalisation in 
manufacturing and services or trade facilitation) is to reduce the size of the net transfer to 
Ireland by $190 million. The elimination of export subsidies implies that Irish producers no 
longer receive support to sell exports to third countries. However, as the majority of 
domestic support in the EU is decoupled in 2014, there is little change in the related 
revenues and expenditure.  
 
Table 5 shows the Irish economy gains by $85 million (0.05 per cent of GDP) from further 
trade liberalisation in industrial goods. This is close to the overall gain for the world 
economy from this simulation and much greater in relative size compared to other EU 
regions. The gain arises mostly from liberalisation among ICs. This result for Ireland is not 
typical of those for ICs. In general, ICs benefit more from liberalisation by the developing 
countries (DCs), as this allows them access to markets in regions previously protected by 
high tariffs and they do not incur the terms of trade losses they suffer in the case of IC 
liberalisation. 
 
Table 6 presents an alternative decomposition of the welfare effects on Ireland of 
liberalising tariffs on manufacturing commodities.
11 Liberalisation of tariffs on trade 
between Ireland and the rest of the EU has zero effect as these tariffs are already set to 
zero (Subtotals 1 and 3 in Table 6). The welfare gains to Ireland from this simulation are 
generated by the reduction of barriers to import of goods from third country regions to 
Ireland and opening of those markets to Irish exporters (Subtotals 2 and 4). Subtotal 2 is 
the main source of the gains in allocative efficiency reported in Table 5. Ireland suffers a 
                                                 
11 A feature of GEMPACK  (the software package used to implement the GTAP model) allows for the 
results of any particular shock in a simulation to be decomposed into parts known as “subtotals”. The result 
of a shock specified as a subtotal as part of larger simulation is equivalent to the result of implementing the 
same shock individually. For more information on GEMPACK, see Harrison and Pearson (1994) and 
www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. See Harrison et al. (1999) for more detailed discussion of the 
decomposition of results and the subtotal feature.    20
welfare loss from the liberalisation of trade between the rest of the EU and third countries 
as indicated in the final three subtotals in Table 6. This is driven by lower cost goods from 
third countries replacing some Irish exports to the rest of the EU and to other third 
countries. Irish exports to the EU fall across all manufacturing sectors. However, overall 
industrial exports from Ireland increase in value terms by approximately $200 million. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 about here 
 
The reduction of import tariffs in this simulation causes a fall in world prices that impacts 
negatively on net-exporters of manufacturing commodities.
12 Because expenditure on 
imports increases, countries must export more to pay for these imports and this drives 
down the price of export goods. Whilst this result is consistent across all countries, there is 
a second terms of trade effect at work. Due to the large share of Irish exports destined for 
EU markets, the fall in Irish export prices is lower than the fall of other EU countries. As 
much of Ireland’s trade is with other EU countries, the reduction of import tariffs 
following WTO liberalisation does not lead to as substantial an increase in imports into 
Ireland as faced by other countries. The pressure on Irish exporters to lower prices and so 
increase exports is therefore also less relative to other countries that must raise the level of 
their exports to maintain their trade balance. EU members that trade more with third 
countries, usually ICs, face a greater terms of trade loss because a larger share of their 
exports face lower world prices in this simulation. However, as Table 6 shows, there are 
strong benefits to Ireland from third country liberalisation as it allows Irish exporters to 
find new markets for goods pushed out of EU markets.  
 
                                                 
12 Statements about price changes arising from a simulation must be interpreted in the context of the model 
closure. The numeraire is a composite world price index of primary factors. Thus, a reduction in world 
import prices relative to this fixed basket of factor prices implies a real increase in wages (factor returns).   21
The Irish economy gains strongly from further liberalisation of services trade. As Table 5 
indicates, the welfare gains for Ireland arise almost entirely from trade liberalisation by ICs. 
Due to the nature of the shock, a productivity increase to imports of service sectors to 
reflect a reduction in non-tariff barriers, it is expected that imports of services would 
increase. There also gains to Irish exporters who, despite being pushed out of some EU 
markets by imports from third countries, are able to increase exports to other ICs and 
DCs.  
 
The change in imports by source shows a consistent pattern of increased imports into 
Ireland from all non-EU regions in most sectors. As intra-EU trade was exempt from this 
liberalisation, imports of services from other EU regions are less competitive due to the 
shock. The growth in imports from DCs slightly exceeds those from the other ICs. On 
average, the tariff equivalents of barriers to trade in services were higher for DCs, therefore 
allowing for a larger relative impact on this group of countries and their exports. The 
dominance of the gains from IC liberalisation is due to efficiency gains achieved from 
replacing imports from the rest of the EU with relatively cheaper services from other 
sources.  
 
Measures to further trade facilitation generate a negative welfare change for Ireland when 
implemented by ICs and DCs (Table 5). This result is in line with most other EU regions. 
The welfare change arising from IC or DC trade facilitation is markedly different. 
 
Trade facilitation is modelled as a cost saving on imports into a region. It is a productivity 
shock and this generates positive welfare effects for Ireland when implemented in the IC 
region (including by Ireland itself). When DC liberalisation occurs there is a term of trade 
loss, due to lower export prices received by Irish producers. This arises because of the   22
greater competition in export markets as DCs strive to increase their exports to balance the 
increase in imports from the trade facilitation shock.  
 
Measures to improve trade facilitation when implemented by Ireland generate welfare gains 
due to the allocative efficiency gains from reducing the costs of imports into Ireland. In the 
case of the IC trade facilitation, this gain counters the terms of trade loss. In the DC 
subtotal, however, the terms of trade loss is not compensated by increased trade efficiency 
at home, thus Ireland experiences a negative welfare effect. That intra-EU trade, and thus a 
large share of Irish trade, is excluded from the positive productivity shock exacerbates the 
impact of the adverse terms of trade effect for Ireland. 
 
4.2 Sectoral Effects 
The changes at a sectoral level in Ireland arising from the trade liberalisation simulation can 
be seen in Table 7. In agriculture, whilst the market price of all commodities falls, the 
effects on agricultural sectors in Ireland are varied. There are large drops in production of 
cattle and sheep (-9.6 per cent) and in the output of the beef and sheepmeat processing 
sector (-15.3 per cent). Imports of beef and sheepmeat, as well as sugar, increase as tariffs 
on imports are reduced. Exports of beef and sheepmeat, other meat products and dairy 
products fall. There is a strong switch in export destinations from non-EU to EU markets 
(or, in the case of beef and sheepmeat, a much greater fall in exports to non-EU markets 
than to EU markets).  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 about here 
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The effect of liberalisation on industrial goods is mixed. Overall, the changes in output in 
manufacturing sectors are quite small. In value terms, the largest reductions are in transport 
equipment and electronic equipment although they are small in percentage terms (1.56 per 
cent and 0.62 per cent per cent falls). There is a sharper percentage fall in the output of the 
textiles and clothing sector. However, output increases in the chemicals and petroleum 
products (0.46 per cent) and mineral and metal products sectors (0.44 per cent). 
 
In all of the industrial sectors in which output expands, the additional output is to supply 
increased demand for Irish exports from other ICs and DCs, however there are some 
decreases in exports to the rest of the EU. The change in imports of manufacturing goods 
into Ireland shows a similar picture with large increases from other ICs and DCs reflecting 
lower barriers to imports from these countries, although it should be noted in value terms 
these changes are lower than those for exports. 
  
Chemical and petroleum products and electronic equipment account for approximately 50 
per cent and 25 per cent of Irish exports of industrial goods in the 2014 pre-liberalisation 
baseline. The domestic output of the former increases 0.46 per cent as a result of industrial 
trade liberalisation whereas production of the latter falls 0.62 per cent. How to explain 
these disparate trends? Domestic demand for both falls, as Irish producers substitute 
towards imported intermediates because their price decreases due to lower import tariffs. 
The differences in the output changes are explained by changes in export demand. 
 
Export demand for chemical and petroleum products rises. While exports of these 
products to many EU markets fall, exports from this sector to the USA increase. The 
decrease in demand for Irish exports in the EU is due to tariff cuts on imports from third 
countries into the EU, resulting in Irish exports to other EU countries being pushed out of   24
some markets. However, consumers and firms in the USA are substituting towards Irish 
exports. This arises because the price of Irish exports into the US fall by more than the 
decrease in composite import prices for the US (i.e. the price of Irish exports to the US 
falls by more than the average for exports from other regions). This results from the 
applied tariff on Irish exports of chemical and petroleum products being higher initially 
than for many other ICs, hence a 50 per cent cut in tariffs implies a greater reduction in the 
price of Irish goods. 
 
For electronic equipment, the demand for Irish exports falls. Exports to the rest of the EU 
decrease for the same reason as chemical and petroleum products (increased competition 
from third country exporters). In addition, in terms of export market shares, EU 
destinations are more important for electronic equipment than for chemical and petroleum 
products. Exports of electronic equipment to the USA also decrease. In this sector, the 
applied tariff rate is zero for Irish exports to the USA; there is therefore no gain from a 
reduction in US tariffs. 
 
Driven by relatively strong increases in the export of services commodities, domestic 
production increases in trade, transport, business and financial and utilities and public 
services. As Table 7 shows, imports also increase in all service sectors except trade services. 
The increase in output of most manufacturing sectors further increases demand for 
services. Those sectors that consume service commodities as intermediate inputs benefit 
from lower cost imports due to the liberalisation of the service trade. This contributes to 
the overall positive effect for the Irish economy from services trade liberalisation. 
 
Trade facilitation measures lead to increased domestic output in most sectors. Whilst the 
trade facilitation shock only applies to agricultural and manufacturing sectors, services also   25
benefit from lower prices and costs. They can increase production in response to higher 
demand for services. In addition, the reduction in resource use in agriculture, due to the 
cuts in support provided to agricultural producers, facilitates the expansion in the output of 
most non-agricultural sectors. 
 
Irish exports to non-EU regions increase for nearly all sectors as a result of improved trade 
facilitation measures (only extra-EU trade was subject to the facilitation shock in this 
scenario). Whilst in agricultural and manufacturing sectors there is some substitution 
among imports from EU regions to non-EU due to the decrease in their price, in services 
there is an expansion of EU imports into Ireland and Irish exports to the EU. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper provides a quantitative study of the economic effects of a stylised scenario of 
further trade liberalisation for Ireland. The GTAP model is used to estimate the potential 
effects on the Irish economy of a successful conclusion to the Doha Round. 
 
Trade liberalisation as simulated in this paper focuses on agriculture, industry, services and 
trade facilitation. These simulations are implemented against a baseline projection of the 
Irish and world economy over the next decade. The shocks do not represent attempts to 
model specific modalities of the ongoing negotiations, rather they are broad measures 
designed to generate results that will be indicative of future changes. 
  
For Ireland, the results of further liberalisation are strongly positive, although agricultural 
trade liberalisation has a slightly negative effect on the overall economy as does improved 
trade facilitation. The gains from the liberalisation of service trade are particularly strong.   26
This and the increased liberalisation of the industrial trade produce unambiguous gains for 
Irish welfare. The negative effect from agricultural trade liberalisation arises because gains 
in allocative efficiency from lower agricultural protection are offset by the loss of net 
transfers from the EU agricultural budget as export subsidies are eliminated. The small loss 
in welfare due to trade facilitation is driven by terms of trade effects from improvements in 
trade facilitation in other countries. Trade facilitation by Ireland itself has a positive impact 
on welfare.   27
Tables 
Table 1: Regional and Sectoral Aggregation 
 
Regions Sectors 
Ireland  Cereals, other crops and horticulture 
United Kingdom Sugar, plants and processed 
Germany  Cattle and sheep
France Other  livestock  (swine, poultry…) 
Rest of EU15  Raw milk
New Members / Accession countries  Beef & sheepmeat (+wool) 
USA Other  meat  products
Canada Dairy
China Beverages and tobacco
India Other  processed food products 
Everything-But-Arms group of countries  Other primary products (extraction industries, 
Mercosur   Textiles, leather and clothing 
Rest of African Caribbean Pacific countries Chemical and petroleum products 
Former Soviet Union countries  Mineral and metal products 
High Income Asian Countries  Transport equipment
Rest of European Free Trade Area  Electronic equipment
Rest of Asia  Other industries
Rest of Latin America  Trade services
Turkey, Middle-East and North Africa Transport services
Rest of the World  Business and financial services 
 Other  private services
   Utilities and public services 
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Table 2: Structure of the Irish Economy in 2001 and 2014 
(2001 US$ Millions) 
 
  Value of Exports  Value of Imports 
Sector  Intra-EU Extra-EU Intra-EU Extra-EU 
Output  Domestic 
Consumption 
Self Sufficiency1  
  2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 
Crops  261 160  40  23  410 486 285 499  1,069 1,127 1,462 1,930  0.73  0.58 
Sugar  7 1 5 3  48  73  19  37  152  152  208  257  0.73  0.59 
Cattle and sheep  93  176  86  69  110  17  64 96  1,303  1,249  1,298 1,117  1.00  1.12 
Other  livestock  123  105  22 20 31 27  9  12  391  413  287  327  1.36  1.26 
Raw  milk  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3  1,361 1,392 1,362 1,396 1.00  1.00 
Beef  &  sheepmeat  839  425  74 28 46 61 40 99  2,033  1,724  1,207 1,431  1.68  1.20 
Other meat products  371  341  37  35  343  428  25  60  953 1,017 914 1,130 1.04 0.90 
Dairy  products  849 519 255 124 242 263  6 26  3,139  3,043  2,282 2,689  1.38  1.13 
Beverages and tobacco  524  620  348  440  406  563 113 166  1,909  2,526  1,556 2,194  1.23  1.15 
Other processed food products  1,578  2,046  981  1,882 1,222 1,655  341  513  4,299 5,907 3,302 4,146  1.30  1.42 
Other primary products  329 212  39  51  495 825 614 917 884  1,202 1,624 2,681  0.54  0.45 
Textiles, leather and clothing  824  303  209  117 1,863  1,552 659 2,412  1,490 867 2,978  4,410 0.50 0.20 
Chemical & petroleum products  13,645 43,540 15,384 54,388  5,341 14,130 2,458  5,880 31,629  105,027 10,399 27,108  3.04  3.87 
Mineral & metal products  2,029  2,428  624  927  2,518  4,610 490  983 7,006  11,211 7,362 13,449  0.95  0.83 
Transport equipment  747  549  129  95  2,639  5,305 1,386 3,221 7,889  13,085  11,038 20,967  0.71  0.62 
Electronic equipment  11,384  15,275 6,557  7,910  9,863 11,266 7,344 13,550  18,503  24,481  17,770 26,112  1.04  0.94 
Other industries  6,947  8,979  4,481 5,020 7,231 9,948 3,974 7,576  17,140  23,927  16,916 27,451  1.01  0.87 
Trade  services  350 410 388 513  3,252  5,487  3,790 8,144  11,631  21,058  17,934 33,766  0.65  0.62 
Transport services  870  964  1,320  1,495  563  897 872  1,582  5,432  8,146  4,677 8,165  1.16  1.00 
Business & financial services  7,913 7,509 6,794 6,795 6,621  12,568 7,056 14,453  27,415  37,179 26,385 49,896  1.04  0.75 
Other private services  531  662  538  685  279 524 279 559  34,030  62,605  33,519 62,343  1.02  1.00 
Utilities & public services  745  626  919  761  322 600 633  1,373  26,242  41,647  25,532 42,233  1.03  0.99 
Note 1: Self-sufficiency calculated as sum of value of domestic production divided by value of domestic consumption. 
Source: GTAP version 6.0 database and model simulation results.   29
Table 3: Applied Trade Protection for Ireland in 2001 and 2014 
(Trade-weighted Averages in %) 
 
Average Import Protection  Average Export Protection 
All Trade  Extra-EU Trade  All Trade  Extra-EU Trade  Sector 
2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 2001 2014 
Crops 5.3  6.3  13.0  12.4  0.8 0.9 6.0 6.8 
Sugar 7.7  6.0  24.5  17.9 24.4 49.4 53.2 63.6 
Cattle and sheep  0.4  0.8  1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Other livestock  0.2  0.2  0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.6 
Raw  milk  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Beef & sheepmeat  46.0  56.3  99.1 90.7  1.4  0.7 10.8  11.3 
Other meat products  1.4  2.4 19.6  19.2 3.6  3.0 37.1  32.1 
Dairy products  0.7  2.5  28.1 28.5  2.2  2.1 9.3  11.1 
Beverages and tobacco  1.1  1.2 5.1 5.1 1.8 2.1 3.5 5.1 
Other processed food products  4.9 5.2  22.2  22.1  5.1 6.0  12.4  12.5 
Other primary products  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 3.8 3.9 
Textiles, leather and clothing  1.8 5.5 6.8 9.1 2.2 3.1 9.9  10.9 
Chemical & petroleum products  0.7 0.6 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.8 2.9 3.3 
Mineral & metal products  0.5  0.4 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.6 9.2 9.5 
Transport equipment  1.1  1.1 3.2 2.9 0.4 0.4 2.9 3.0 
Electronic equipment  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.6 
Other industries  0.3  0.4  0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.8 2.2 
Trade services  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transport services  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Business & financial services  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other private services  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Utilities & public services  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: GTAP version 6.0 database and model simulation results.   30
Table 4: Total Welfare Effects 
(Measured as Equivalent Variation in 2001 US$ Millions and % of GDP) 
 
Global Liberalisation  Industrialised Country 
Liberalisation Only  Region 
$M  % of GDP  $M  % of GDP 
Ireland  137 0.08 210 0.13 
UK  1,644 0.09 1,641 0.09 
Germany  1,203 0.05 1,228 0.06 
France  568 0.04 585 0.04 
Rest EU15  5,977  0.16 5,271 0.14 
CEEC  1,744 0.30 1,817 0.31 
USA 8,906  0.07  11,100  0.09 
Canada  2,073 0.25 1,933 0.24 
China  22,909 1.08 10,149 0.48 
India  6,055 0.87 1,157 0.17 
EBA 1,068  0.16  -1,430  -0.22 
Mercosur 6,164  0.59 2,277 0.22 
Rest ACP  1,890  1.28 1,002 0.68 
Former Soviet Union  2,244  0.33  2,039  0.30 
High Income Asian  24,182  0.40  20,805  0.35 
Rest EFTA  6,311 1.15 6,238 1.14 
Rest Asia  10,740 1.49  2,119  0.29 
Rest Latin America  5,242 0.34 -910 -0.06 
Mediterranean 5,193  0.31  -3,247  -0.20 
Rest of World  5,411  0.63  1,020  0.12 
Total 119,660  0.30  65,004  0.16 
Source: GTAP model simulation results.   31
Table 5: Welfare Effects for Ireland 
(Measured as Equivalent Variation in 2001 US$ Millions) 
 
  Welfare Change 
 
US$ Millions 
    
Total    132 
    
    
Allocative Efficiency Effect    306 
Technology Effect    360 
Terms of Trade Effect    -511 
Investment and Savings Price Effect    154 
EU Budgetary Effect    -177 
    
    
Agriculture    -44 
       Domestic support reductions – EU and USA  2 
       Domestic support reductions – Rest of World  1 
       Tariff Reductions – Industrialised Countries  90 
       Tariff Reductions – Developing Countries  19 
       Export Subsidies Abolished  34 
       EU Budgetary Effect  -190 
    
Manufacturing    85 
       Tariff Reductions – Industrialised Countries  58 
       Tariff Reductions – Developing Countries  9 
       EU Budgetary Effect  18 
    
Services    196 
       Tariff Reductions – Industrialised Countries  179 
       Tariff Reductions – Developing Countries  17 
       EU Budgetary Effect    0 
    
Trade Facilitation    -100 
       Trade Facilitation – Industrialised Countries  23 
       Trade Facilitation – Developing Countries  -118 
       EU Budgetary Effect  -5 
Source: GTAP model simulation results.   32
 Table 6: Welfare Effects on Ireland –  
Manufacturing Tariff Liberalisation Only 
(2001 US$ Millions) 
 
Breakdown of Tariff Reductions  Welfare  
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Rest of EU to Ireland  0 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Third Countries to Ireland  88 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Ireland to Rest of EU  0 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Ireland to Third Countries  676 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Rest of EU to Third Countries  -269 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Third Countries to Rest of EU  -138 
Reduction of tariffs on manufacturing goods from Third Countries to Third Countries  -290 
Total  67 
Source: GTAP model simulation results.   33
Table 7: Resource Allocation Effects for Ireland 
























% $M  $M  $M %  %  % $M 
Crops -1.20  14.18  -26.10  -9.18 1.10 -1.64 -3.11 -7.40 
Sugar -0.27  6.58  -12.76  -2.90 5.87 -7.60  -70.28  -0.24 
Cattle and sheep  -1.93  -32.45  -152.24 25.76  -17.09  -9.64 7.82 47.10 
Other livestock  -0.95  -3.08  -19.55  -0.35 -4.79 -3.38 -0.17 -0.74 
Raw milk  -11.94  -1.52  0.00  0.86 -33.61 0.00 102.21 2.21 
Beef & sheepmeat  -1.39  162.89  -304.65 -134.58  98.22  -15.28  -25.36  -197.00 
Other meat products  -0.41 14.01  -60.69  -36.10 2.67 -5.46 -9.05  -37.94 
Dairy products  -6.57  -18.78  16.38  -34.24  -5.34 0.47 -4.39  -35.30 
Beverages and tobacco  -0.29  3.04 13.37 7.89  0.47  0.59 0.86 -2.86 
Other processed food products  -0.54 58.42 86.09  124.06 2.88 1.55 3.67  58.48 
Other primary products  -0.48 19.69 -1.20 -3.43 0.41 -0.06 -0.37  49.51 
Textiles, leather and clothing  -0.38  37.67 -19.75 -7.09  1.14  -2.53 -1.93  -26.97 
Chemical & petroleum products  0.40 162.91  411.44  484.12 0.84 0.46 0.59  -165.81 
Mineral & metal products  0.48  38.90 44.72 82.01  0.78 0.44 2.85  71.00 
Transport equipment  0.52  55.18  -194.62 -20.22  0.74  -1.57 -3.35 3.22 
Electronic equipment  0.47  -62.77  -124.33  -117.43  -0.30 -0.62 -0.61  -22.25 
Other industries  0.40  27.74  49.13 95.45  0.18  0.24 0.80  91.74 
Trade services  0.60  -91.59  64.87 27.67 -0.83  0.37 3.50  112.33 
Transport services  0.31  10.02 68.54 63.63  0.47  0.95 2.36  51.09 
Business & financial services  0.64 19.97  213.71  192.40  0.09 0.65 1.51  235.93 
Other private services  0.60  1.76 -101.51  12.94  0.19  -0.19 1.11 10.94 
Utilities & public services  0.59  4.98 26.72  20.74 0.29 0.07 1.54  20.68 
Source: GTAP model simulation results. 
The change in market prices is relative to the change in the consumer price index in Ireland. Note that all prices are initially equal one; changes are shown relative to the numeraire. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Applied Trade Protection for Irish Imports and Exports in 2001 and 2014 
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